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| Volume 1, No. 2,
August 2002
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| Rationing
as a Signal |
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| Jeong-Yoo Kim |
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Department of Economics,
University at Albany, SUNY, U.S.A.
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Department of Economics, Dongguk University, South Korea |
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| Abstract |
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| Two
consumers sequentially purchase at most one unit of some homogeneous
good from a monopolist who knows the state of nature, either high
or low. I characterize a rationing equilibrium at which the high-type
monopolist produces only one unit and rations customers, whereas
the low-type monopolist serves customers by producing two units.
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Key words:
rationing; quality; signals; sequential purchases |
| JEL
classification:
D45; L12; L15 |
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